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To understand attitudes about voting in Kenya, this study examines Kenyan 
voters’ feelings of freedom to vote according to their own will and without pressure.  
More specifically it seeks to determine the extent to which these feelings are affected by 
1) perception of corruption, 2) levels of trust in the government, 3) fear of political 
violence and intimidation, and 4) ethnic identity. Rational choice theory and an insider-
outsider perspective are applied to examine the issue from a theoretical framework. 
Previous research conducted in relation to voting behavior and perception of corruption, 
trust in government, and ethnicity, among other things, are considered. This study uses 
secondary data collected by the Afrobarometer in 2008, and bivaraite and multivariate 
analysis are employed.   
Logistic regression models are used to examine the extent to which certain 
variables explain feelings of freedom to vote according to personal preference. The 
results from the logistic regression analyses show that both trust in government and fear 
of being subject to political violence and intimidation affect Kenyan voters’ feelings of 
freedom to vote according to their personal preference. These results support two 
  viii 
hypotheses. First, Kenyan voters will feel freer to vote according to their own preference 
as their levels of trust in the government increase. Second, Kenyan voters’ feelings of 
freedom to vote will be negatively associated with fear of being subject to political 
violence and intimidation.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The African Union Commission is seriously preoccupied with the recent 
happenings in Kenya due to the presidential elections as well as the violence that 
followed the announcement of the results. The Commission reiterates its 
attachment to democratic principles as stipulated in the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union and in the African Charter for Democracy, Elections and 
Governance, particularly when it comes to free, fair, and transparent elections, in 
conformity to the Declaration of the Union on the principles governing 
democratic elections in Africa. (Addis Ababa December 31, 2007) 
 
        
The term “democracy” can be traced back to the ancient Greek word 
“demokratia,” which meant people-power, and it has developed over the centuries to have 
a wide range of definitions and variations. At the core of the principles of democracy 
there is wide consensus that a democracy refers to “government of the people by the 
people for the people,” as Abraham Lincoln envisioned it (Cartledge 2009 
[www.bbc.co.uk]). As history evolves, there has been a widespread trend towards global 
democratization, but some countries have been slower in this process than others. While 
countries such as the United States and France can trace their transformation toward 
democracy centuries back hundreds of years, most countries in Africa can go only as far 
as a few decades in tracing their attempt at becoming democratic countries. This study 
looks at one such country in Africa, Kenya, whose recent push towards becoming a 
democracy has proven to be a challenging task, as she experienced a wave of violence 
after the 2007 national elections.  
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At the heart of a Democracy lies a country’s electoral system and its ability to 
conduct free and fair elections.  In referring to what a democratic electoral system should 
look like, the United Nation’s articles state that: 
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will 
shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal 
and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting 
procedures. (United Nations 2010 [www.un.org; Article 21]) 
 
Since its independence, Kenya has envisioned having free and fair elections such as those 
described by the UN articles, but like many countries in the same situation, corruption 
has found its way deep into the roots of the government, and it has made it nearly 
impossible for Kenya to attain free and fair democratic elections thus far. The United 
Nations Office of Drug and Crime (UNODC) deals in large part with corruption, but fails 
to give it a clear and specific definition. Instead corruption is described as a phenomenon 
that “undermines democratic institutions, slows economic development and contributes to 
governmental instability (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 2010. 
[www.unodc.org; para. 1])” The UNODC instead defines corruption through describing 
it: 
Corruption attacks the foundation of democratic institutions by distorting electoral 
processes, perverting the rule of law and creating bureaucratic quagmires whose 
only reason for existing is the soliciting of bribes. (United Nations Office of 
Drugs and Crime 2010[www.unodc.org; para.1]) 
 
The purpose of this study is to measure the extent to which citizens of Kenya feel 
free to vote according to their own will, without reservations and without fear of political 
intimidation and violence. Furthermore, this study seeks to find the extent to which these 
feelings of freedom to vote according to one’s own preference are affected by levels of 
trust in the government, levels of perceived corruption in the government, and personal 
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views on whether the past elections of 2007 were free and fair. Last but not least, this 
study seeks to determine whether belonging to a dominant ethnic group in Kenya plays a 
significant role in voters’ freedom to vote, and, if so, to what extent.  
This study uses the data of the Afrobarometer survey conducted in Kenya in 2008. 
The Afrobarometer is now on its fourth round, and much research has been conducted on 
topics that closely relate to this study. However, the results gathered from this research 
will be unique in that none of the studies previously done with these data have looked at 
Kenya’s citizenry’s feelings of freedom to vote according to personal preference without 
pressure. With this said, topics such as voting behavior and attitudes and issues such as 
perceived corruption and political trust have been an area of extensive study for political 
scientists and other professional scholars. In addition, much research relating to Kenya 
and neighboring countries has focused on ethnicity and its defining role in different social 
and political issues.  
This study analyzes previous research conducted on these various issues in hopes 
of shedding light on the main focus of this study. More specifically the studies included 
in the review look at previous research conducted on voting behavior and the effects that 
perceived corruption and political trust have on voters. A close look at what researchers 
have found on ethnicity as it is related to voting in Kenya is also considered. The 
literature review is followed by the theoretical frameworks considered and those by a 
detailed description of the methodology that was employed. Next is an analysis of the 
results and a concluding section devoted to reflection on the results of this study.  
However, first consider a brief note on why this study is pertinent and in need of 
investigation.  
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After multiple failed attempts at true, fair, and democratic elections, the instability 
and fragmentation of Kenya’s national government manifested itself in a case of violent 
political riots shortly after the 2007 elections. Results from previous studies  of the 
Afrobarometer Survey suggest that citizens of Kenya felt that little progress was made in 
tackling corruption after the 2002 elections (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No 48 2006), 
and most of them thought that either some problems or major problems would follow the 
2007 elections (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No 26 2008). If the people of Kenya were 
able to accurately predict the violence that was to follow as the 2007 elections 
progressed, how does this affect the way these people vote and how they feel about their 
personal freedom to express their opinion through voting? Did the extent of their 
perception of corruption in which the government is involved affect their voting 
behavior? Does their level of trust in the government affect how they feel about their 
freedom to vote? Moreover, are they fearful of being subject to political violence and 
intimidation, and, if so, to what extent does this affect how they feel about the extent of 
their freedom to voice their opinion through the process of voting? Last, how are all these 
factors related to and affected by ethnic identity? Does being a member of a dominant 
tribe in Kenya trump all other factors when it comes to voting? Or, do voters consider 
their own opinion and put ethnic politics aside when it comes to voting? It is these 
questions that have triggered my curiosity and encouraged me to pursue this research 
project.  
Voting freedom is fundamental for a country to carry out fair and free elections 
and, thus, take a step closer to becoming a democratic state. This issue has various 
theoretical implications. The section that follows discusses two theoretical perspectives to 
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make sense of the issue at hand and later the results of this particular study. First a 
rational-choice-theoretical framework combined with a theory of residues is employed to 
aid in better understanding voters’ behavior and attitudes.  Advocates of this perspective 
contend that human behavior is rational and based on careful analysis of costs and 
benefits. While this theoretical approach is the central theory behind the premises of this 
research, a necessity to analyze the role of ethnic identity last led me to consider a second 
theory, the insider-outsider theory. This theory analyzes the issue at hand by placing 
focus on the individual voters and their status in relation to individual accessibility to 
information. The insider-outsider perspective also examines perception of corruption, but 
it ties it to voters’ attitudes by analyzing the voter as the unit of analysis. The following 
chapter goes into further inquiry of the three theoretical approaches mentioned thus far. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
The electoral history of Kenya can be described as a long struggle for power 
overshadowed by an ethnically fragmented population and fueled by a long history of 
ethnic conflict. The purpose of this study is to try to make sense of the voting behavior of 
Kenyan citizens and to shed light on the dynamics that influence voters’ freedom to 
express their opinions during presidential elections. More specifically, the goal of this 
research is to focus on Kenya’s voting population and to analyze their views on the levels 
of corruption in the government, their trust in the government, and their fear of being 
subject to political violence or intimidation in order to address a broader issue, freedom 
to vote according to one’s personal preference during national elections in Kenya. The 
section that follows analyzes this issue through a theoretical framework in order to better 
comprehend the implications of the research question. First, a rational choice theory will 
be considered to examine certain factors affecting voting behavior. This will be followed 
by a careful analysis of the insider-outsider perspective, which will aid in explaining the 
role that ethnic identity plays in individuals’ overall decision-making process in voting.  
A Rational Choice Approach and Pareto’s Theory of Residues 
Vilfredo Pareto ([1916] 1935) analyzes human behavior through his theory of 
residues and derivations. He argues that human action is not necessarily rational but that 
people use theories and explanations in order to make actions seem logical. Moreover, he 
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contends that there are underlying sentiments and feelings that directly affect human 
behavior and, that in many cases, these come before the rational explanation. Pareto 
([1916] 1935) argues that it is these sentiments that shape the explanations by which 
people rationalize their actions. He calls these sentiments “residues,” and the 
explanations by which humans rationalize action the “derivations” (Pareto). According to 
Pareto, residues are found somewhere between human instinct and the belief systems that 
help people rationalize action. These sentiments are not a reflection of human instincts 
but a manifestation of them, and, thus, whether people are conscious about them or not, 
residues affect human behavior (Pareto [1916] 1935).  
I adopt this theoretical framework only to acknowledge that rationalization of 
action can be rooted in deeper sentiments, whether conscious or unconscious. This is 
done to recognize Pareto’s notion of residues and combine it with a rational-choice 
approach, which together will serve as the theoretical framework by which the issue 
under study will be analyzed. I deviate from Pareto’s theory because he argues that most 
action is not rational and that instead theories and explanations serve only to make action 
appear rational (Pareto). Instead I adopt a rational-choice theory approach because, while 
I agree that there may be unconscious sentiments that affect action, Pareto does not 
provide any evidence that action is not rational. As further explained in the following 
section, rational-choice theory asserts that people analyze potential behavior through a 
rational process, which people use to make final decisions to act one way or another.  
By combining Pareto’s idea of residues with a rational-choice approach, it will be 
illustrated that when a person engages in a rational analysis of costs and benefits, this 
analysis is affected by deeper sentiments that must be taken into account. These deeper 
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sentiments, or notion of residues, combined with the rational-choice theory approach can 
be used to explain the effect that both trust in government and perceived corruption as 
well as fear (of political violence) can have on a person’s feelings of freedom to vote 
according to personal views and his or her overall voting behavior.   
Rational Choice Theory 
Rational choice theory, as defined by Peter Abell (2009:1):  
invites us to understand individual actors (which in specified circumstances may 
be collectivities of one sort or another) as acting, or more likely interacting, in a 
manner such that they can be deemed to be doing the best they can for 
themselves, given their objectives, resources, and circumstances, as they see 
them. 
 
In other words, the modern rational-choice theory explains human behavior in terms of 
cost-benefit analysis. It contends that human beings are rational, and decisions and 
actions are preceded by a cost-benefit analysis of possible outcomes and rewards.   
 George Homans (1958) introduces this notion in his exchange theory with his 
“rationality proposition,” in which he argues that humans rate behaviors in terms of how 
rewarding they will be; whether a person decides to perform an action will depend on his 
or her perception of the probability that he or she will succeed. Thibaut and Kelley (1959) 
extended Homan’s theory by introducing the comparison levels of alternatives. They 
argued that human beings rate behavior on a scale from most rewarding to most costly, 
and they are constantly comparing options and alternatives in terms of their perceived 
rate of costs and rewards of each. They believe that all behavior is guided by this 
comparison of alternatives and that humans are constantly looking for something better. 
Political scientists have since found a way to apply this approach to voting behavior, 
mainly by looking for patterns that explain why people vote and why they do not. 
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Rational-Behavior Theory of Voting Participation 
Feddersen (2004) uses rational choice theory to analyze the paradox of not voting. 
He explains that there is widespread evidence suggesting that the probability that an 
individual vote can actually change an election outcome is extremely small (Feddersen 
2004; Riker and Ordeshook 1968).  This means that, if people voted only for the purpose 
of making a difference in an election outcome, very few would show up to vote. 
However, many people do, in fact, show up and put up with a variety of inconveniences 
to vote. Like many other scholars, Feddersen (2004) feels that this paradox can be 
explained through a theory of rational choice. Durden and Gaynor (1987) follow this 
theoretical framework in analyzing voting behavior. They suggest that voting is a rational 
action, and that people will vote when the benefits will exceed the costs.  
There are many factors that can be considered as costs and benefits to voters. 
Multiple researchers agree that a sense of civic obligation or duty acts as a strong reward 
or factor pushing people to vote. (Blais 2000; Durden and Gaynor 1987; Feddersen 2004; 
Riker and Ordeshook 1968).  Another possible factor that can act as a reward or 
motivation to vote is the argument that those who feel that voting is their given right will 
vote regardless of what the cost or outcome might be (Durden and Gaynor 1987). With 
this said, people who feel morally obligated to take advantage of their voting rights still 
have to make a choice in terms of how they vote, and different factors can persuade them 
to vote one way or another. For example, there are groups of people that share political 
views and beliefs, who can be mobilized in masses by leaders. From this, members of the 
groups can be affected by peer pressure, so to speak, and they not only fulfill a civic duty 
to vote but an obligation to vote a specific way. This type of mobilization is said to be 
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caused by the leaders themselves who place social pressure on the citizens. (Shachar and 
Nalebuff 1999; Uhlander 1989). As portrayed thus far, the decision making-process 
behind voting behavior is an extremely complex one. What follows is an application of 
the theoretical implications made thus far to the research question under study.  
Applied Theory: Residues and Rational-Choice Approach Combined 
The focus of this study is to analyze the extent to which Kenyan voters feel free to 
vote according to their own will. Furthermore, how is their freedom to express their own 
opinion through voting affected by their perception of levels of corruption in the 
government, their trust in the government, and their fear of being subjected to political 
violence? To better understand this issue, it is imperative to analyze it through a 
theoretical framework.  Thus far, Pareto’s ([1916] 1935) theory of residues and a rational 
choice theory have been examined independently. Now, through combining the two 
perspectives I will analyze the question under consideration.  
 Following a rational-choice approach as applied to voting behavior would imply 
that voters, when making a decision about their voting behavior, will first analyze the 
costs and benefits previously explained. Some of the costs include finding a way to get to 
the voting booth, being stigmatized for not complying with social pressure, and the 
chance of becoming a victim of political violence. Some of the benefits include the 
fulfillment of civic duty, taking advantage of a given right, and social acceptance.  
Adding Pareto’s notion of residues would imply that there are certain sentiments, 
feelings, or attitudes that precede this rational weighing of costs and benefits. That is 
where perception of corruption, trust in government, and fear of political violence come 
in.  All three of these are personal feelings or attitudes that play roles in shaping the way 
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an individual will go about analyzing costs and benefits. This is illustrated through the 
following example.  
 A person is in a voting booth and is trying to decide for whom to vote. This voter 
has three options, Candidate A, Candidate B, and Candidate C. This voter prefers 
Candidate B, but Candidate A seems to be the more popular choice. In making the final 
decision, whether to vote for Candidate A or B, this voter will analyze the possible costs 
and possible benefits of voting for each candidate.  This is where the so called “residues,” 
or sentiments preceding this decision, become critical. If this person has low levels of 
trust in government, perceives high levels of corruption, or is afraid of being subject to 
political violence, he or she will be more likely to feel threatened by costs such as falling 
victim to political crimes. He or she may feel that, given the circumstances, the costs 
outweigh the gains. On the other hand, having positive attitudes about the government 
and having little fear of becoming a victim of political violence will decrease the amount 
of importance placed on such costs and, thus, will increase the chance that the voter will 
feel free to vote for whom he or she prefers.  
Insider-Outsider Perspective: Perceived Levels of Corruption and Voting Attitudes 
In trying to understand voting behavior in Kenya, it is important to not only 
understand voting patterns and theoretical implications but to really grasp the current 
situation specific to the time and place under consideration. In Kenya’s case ethnic 
divisions are so deeply imprinted in the culture that one could not properly analyze the 
elections without paying close attention to how ethnic identity will affect individuals’ 
voting behavior. Thus far I have considered how perception of corruption, trust in 
government, and fear of political violence affect the decision-making process involved in 
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voting. However, in Kenya’s case all of this is subject to change when ethnic identity is 
added to the equation. An insider-outsider perspective will be used to better understand 
the effect that ethnicity has on voting behavior.  
The insider-outsider perspective analyzes individuals with respect to the access 
that they have to political figures. This theory is based on the idea that having access to 
political figures gives individuals certain advantages over those who do not have access. 
For this reason proponents of this theory argue that attitudes about the government, such 
as perceived levels of corruption, vary depending on whether a citizen is considered an 
insider or an outsider (Chang and Kerr 2009). Those who have preferential access to 
political figures are considered to be insiders, and those who lack this access are the 
outsiders. The main argument behind this theory is that insiders tend to feel that political 
parties and institutions have lower levels of corruption, while outsiders feel the opposite 
and tend to be less content with the overall institution. Chang and Kerr argue that insiders 
will perceive lower levels of corruption because they are less likely to look for 
information in relation to government corruption. Many insiders have a strong loyalty to 
their political figure or party. Chang and Kerr argue that, if insiders come across such 
information, they will disregard it on the grounds of lack of reliability. In other words, 
they will choose not to believe it. 
Using the insider-outsider perspective to analyze Kenya can have some important 
implications. Because Kenya’s political world is so distinctively divided by ethnic 
groups, having insider or outsider status will depend largely on the ethnic group or tribe 
to which voters belong and the ethnic group that is currently in control, and, thus, so will 
attitudes about the government. Following this train of thought, a voter’s ethnic identity 
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will play an important role in determining the status as either insider or outsider. Thus, a 
voter who belongs to the same ethnic group as the party currently in control will have 
different opinions about the government from one who belongs to the opposing party’s 
ethnic group.  This is best illustrated by an example.  
There are two voters, Voter 1 and Voter 2. Voter 1 belongs to ethnic tribe X ,and 
Voter 2 belongs to ethnic tribe Y. Each voter has three options; Candidate A, Candidate 
B, and Candidate C. The current president, who happens to be Candidate A, belongs to 
ethnic tribe X. The week before the elections there is a media outbreak in which it is 
speculated that the current president, Candidate A, is to blame for a violent attempt to 
intimidate the opposition leader, Candidate B. Candidate B belongs to ethnic group Y, the 
same as that of Voter 2. The question is whether there will be a difference in attitudes 
between voters 1 and 2 and whether this difference affected by the voters’ ethnicity?  
Framing this question under the insider- outsider perspective, the answer to both 
parts of this question is yes. Because Voter 1 belongs to the same ethnic tribe as 
Candidate A, he will have more access to this party or information about this party; and 
due to these advantages and possibly his loyalty, he will be less likely to believe that 
Candidate A was to blame for unlawful behavior. On the other hand, voter 2, who 
belongs to the opposition tribal group that was violently threatened, has no inside 
information as to the kind of activity in which candidate A’s party is engaged, and so he 
or she believes the speculations about Candidate A. In turn, Voter 2 has less trust in the 
current president, (also Candidate A), perceives higher levels of corruption in the 
government, and is more afraid of political violence than Voter 1 is. As explained 
through the insider-outsider perspective and portrayed through this example, ethnic 
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identity plays a critical role in the political and social world of Kenya, and, thus, it is 
crucial to this study.   
Conclusion 
The process of explaining voting behavior through a theoretical framework is a 
complex task. It becomes even more challenging when targeting a country such as 
Kenya, where specific factors such as ethnic identity play such an active role in voters’ 
lives. The purpose of this research is to understand what factors play a role in Kenyan 
voters’ personal feelings about their freedom to vote according to their own will and 
without pressure. This chapter places the issue under multiple theoretical perspectives to 
aid in the analysis of the complex issue. First a rational-choice theory accompanied by 
Pareto’s ([1916] 1935) theory of residues was used to better understand certain attitudinal 
factors, and second, an insider-outsider perspective was utilized to shed light on the 
complexity of ethnic belonging in Kenya and the role that it might play in voters’ 
behavior. The chapter that follows is a review of previous literature relating to voting 
behavior and other key issues in this study. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
As briefly discussed in Chapter I, this study focuses on feelings of freedom to 
vote according to one’s own will among Kenyan voters. Through this study I seek to find 
out the extent to which five specific factors affect how Kenyans feel about their freedom 
to express their personal views through voting. The factors considered include perceived 
corruption in the government, trust in the national government, fear of political violence 
and intimidation, ethnicity, and whether voters feel that the 2007 elections were free and 
fair.  
This section highlights important research previously conducted on areas related 
to this study. The first section describes the political situation and key past elections in 
Kenya. This section is followed by a brief overview of previous research on corruption 
and political trust. Finally, the last two sections will look at voting behavior, with the last 
section placing emphasis on voting as it relates to ethnicity.  
Road to Democracy: Past Elections 
Kenya’s electoral history has shown that the road to becoming a free and 
independent state does not occur without struggle. Although attaining its independence in 
1963, the second half of the 20th century in Kenya is evidence that democracy is far from 
easy to achieve and even harder to maintain.  Kenya’s first attempt at a multi-party 
government was not made until 1992, thirty years after its independence. Although the 
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government was formed of multiple coalitions, it was extremely fragmented; and the 
elections were far from fair and democratic (Throup 1993). The 1992 elections brought 
hope of democracy to Kenyans, who were growing increasingly disenchanted with 
President Daniel Arap Moi, who had been in power since 1978. Even though an effort 
was made at having fair and democratic elections in 1992, they did not happen without 
political killings. 
The government that was formed from the 1992 general elections was deeply 
fragmented, mainly due to the facts that the elections were a product of violence between 
opposition groups and the end result was achieved through fixed elections (Throup 1993). 
As a result President Moi remained in power, but the legitimacy of his power was 
weakened while the opposition parties were extremely fragmented and volatile, which 
combination made for a very inefficient government (Throup). The elections of 1992 
shed light on the nature of an electoral process that was supposed to be fair and just. After 
a failed attempt to use their free will to get rid of President Moi and form a new 
government, these elections left many citizens of Kenya disillusioned (Throup). President 
Moi ruled Kenya until stepping down in 2002 (CIA The World Factbook 2010). 
The 2002 elections in Kenya marked what was meant to be a turn toward 
democracy and an end to an era of corruption within the national government. A new 
government was formed with a new leader in office, and by 2003 there was a 78 percent 
rate of satisfaction with democracy among the citizens of Kenya (Afrobarometer Briefing 
Paper No 25 2006).  This positive outlook, however, did not last long. By 2005 the same 
survey showed a drop to a 53 percent rate of satisfaction with democracy 
(Afrobaromerter Briefing Paper No 25 2006). Although the 2002 elections were won on 
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an anticorruption campaign (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No 26 2008), a briefing paper 
published by Afrobarometer, “Corruption in Kenya, 2005: Is NARC Fulfilling Its 
Campaign Promise?” suggests that Kenya’s end to corruption is yet to come. After 
analyzing the results from the Afrobarometer survey conducted in Kenya in 2005, these 
researchers have concluded that the citizens of Kenya do not feel that there has been very 
much progress, if any, in the alleged efforts made by the government to tackle corruption 
(Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No 48 2006). Further research from the same institution 
conducted on the following elections showed little improvement.  
Briefing paper, “Ethnicity and Violence in the 2007 Elections in Kenya,” 
(Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No 48 2006) looks at the results of a detailed survey that 
was given to citizens of Kenya immediately before the elections took place. This was 
done to gain an insight into voters’ intentions and feelings toward violence and 
corruption in relation to the upcoming elections. In this survey the respondents were 
asked whether they felt that the elections were going to be free and fair, and 70 percent of 
the respondents said that they “expected some problems,” while around 50 percent 
“expected major problems or worse” (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No 26 2008). 
Public Opinion and Attitudes: Perceived Corruption and Political Trust 
In analyzing voting freedom it is imperative to take a close look at corruption and 
the role it plays in affecting voters. One of the hypotheses of this study contends that 
voters of Kenya will feel less free to vote according to their own will if they feel that 
there is a high level of corruption in the government. In other words, perceived corruption 
will have a negative effect on feelings of freedom to vote without reservation.  As defined 
by Chang and Kerr (2009:4) perceived corruption refers to “the degree to which citizens 
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believe that a political actor or entity is involved in corrupt practices.” Corruption, in 
contrast, refers to the “the abuse of public power for some private benefit,” as defined by 
Canache and Allison (2005:91). Chang and Kerr (2009) make a key point in stressing the 
importance of conceptualizing the perception of corruption and differentiating it from 
corruption. Whether or not there really is corruption in government does not matter in 
terms of voting behavior if the people are not aware of it. Consequently, in this study I 
account only for the perceived levels of corruption because it is the perception of the 
amount of corruption in which the government is involved that affects how people feel 
about voting.  
Findings by Seligson (2002) and Treisman (2007) suggest that perceived 
corruption is not linked to real corruption through evidence so it is important to take into 
account the fact that citizens’ personal estimates of the amount of corruption and the 
actual amount of corruption are by no means equal. Canache and Allison (2005) further 
discuss this issue, and they make two important points in relation to the necessity for the 
distinction between perceived corruption and actual corruption. First, they stress the need 
for citizens to be able to have an accurate perception of actual corruption. If voters 
thought all politicians were corrupt, democracy and democratic elections would be 
pointless. Second, it is imperative that citizens are able to aim their perception of 
corruption accurately and at the right people; otherwise the democratic political system 
would again be undermined.  
This study focuses specifically on the perception that citizens have of the amount 
of corruption that goes on in the Kenyan government. Although much research has been 
conducted on corruption, few studies relate it to feelings of freedom to vote according to 
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one’s own personal views. Research has been conducted, however, linking corruption 
with trust in government, another key variable. Canache and Allison’s (2005) study 
connects perception of corruption with public opinion, arguing that the former can have a 
significant effect on the latter, and it can ultimately affect democratic processes such as 
elections. This type of research portrays the magnitude of the role that public opinion and 
attitudes can have on the electoral outcomes, thus showing the importance of the topic 
under study. 
In a study done in Mexico, Morris (1991) focused specifically on perception of 
corruption, and he finds a strong relationship between perception of the existence of 
corruption and low trust in government.  Della Porta (2000) finds that citizens’ trust in 
government and its capacity to meet the people’s needs is undermined greatly by 
corruption. Although the direct relationship between corruption and trust in government 
is not the focus of this study, I hypothesize that both of these factors are associated with 
citizens’ feelings of personal freedom to vote. In terms of  political trust, I suspect that it 
plays a significant role in shaping people’s feelings about voting and their voting 
behavior. Kuenzi and Lambright (2005) tested whether attitudes such as political trust 
have a significant effect on voting participation in Africa, and they did not find a 
significant relationship. Their results are consistent with previous findings on the same 
topic (Bratton 1999). These results do not undermine the hypotheses of this study because 
I do not seek to determine whether attitudes such as political trust affect voting 
participation. Rather, I am interested in finding the extent to which these attitudes affect 
how citizens of Kenya feel about their freedom to vote. The fact that political trust is not 
a significant factor driving voters to the booths is important to keep in mind, but it does 
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not tell us whether deciding for whom to vote is affected by these attitudes once at the 
booth.   
Although previous research suggests that political trust does not affect whether a 
person decides to vote or not, whether to vote and how to vote are two completely 
different decisions. Consequently, I still hypothesize that political trust does affect voters’ 
feelings about their freedom to express their opinion through voting, even if political trust 
is not related to the initial decision process that voters undergo when deciding to vote or 
not to vote. Thus, in relation to these findings, I hope to find out whether political trust 
affects the way people feel about their freedom to vote as they wish.  
Some of these studies previously mentioned also analyze variables that will be 
included as control variables in this study. Canache and Allison (2005) find that, in their 
study of Latin American countries, factors such as sex, age, education, and social class 
are all significantly associated with perception of corruption. This study will control for 
all those variables in order to see whether they help explain feelings of freedom to vote. 
The following section looks at previous research relating to voting behavior. 
Voting Behavior 
Voting behavior and patterns in voting have been a focus of study for scholars 
across the board of disciplines, and extensive literature exists on the issue from research 
conducted on a variety of different countries. There seems to be widespread consensus 
that, as Keunzi and Lambright (2005:14) point out, “political efficacy is regularly linked 
to political participation.” In an earlier study done in the United States, Palfrey and 
Poole’s (1987) findings support this claim, arguing that levels of political knowledge are 
significantly correlated with an individual’s likelihood to vote. Furthermore, they find 
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that there is a positive relationship between political knowledge and predictability in 
voting behavior. That is, voting behavior is far more predictable for individuals who are 
informed than for those who are uninformed.  
Previous studies have been done relating to voting in Africa, and they find that 
there is not a difference in levels of political knowledge between voters and nonvoters 
(Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005). The fact that 
these findings are supported by multiple researchers is puzzling because it does not 
comply with the patterns found by previous research in relation to political knowledge 
and voting participation. Kuenzi and Lambright explain that this could be logically 
explained if voting in Africa is driven by outside forces such as patronage and other 
forces that mobilize voters. These outside factors make voting behavior in Africa unique 
in that political knowledge cannot be used as an accurate measure of political 
participation, nor can one rely on it to predict voting patterns. Instead, to understand 
Kenya’s voting behavior, other factors must be taken into account.  
In Kenya factors affecting voting behavior include vote buying and clientelism 
among other things. Kramon (2009) argues that, after studying survey data from the 2002 
elections, vote buying is very much a pertinent force affecting voter turnout in Kenyan 
elections. This is important to take into consideration. To learn the extent to which voters 
in Kenya feel free to express their own opinion through voting, I assume that they are 
voting freely in the first place. I assume this because Kenya’s electoral system is driven 
by democratic values; but, in the case in which people are forced to vote, I expect that 
this will be manifested in answers to the survey question relating to feelings about 
freedom to voice one’s own opinion through voting. The way I rationalize this is that, if 
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people are being forced to vote, they will be forced to do so one way or another, thereby 
not being free to vote according to their own will. Thus, I do not find whether someone is 
being motivated to participate in elections a necessary variable in my study, but I do urge 
future research to look into the topic. 
 This is also true for other motivating factors such as clientelism; previous 
research suggests that some form of patron-client relationship in which favors are granted 
in exchange for votes is popular among African voters (Lindberg and Morrison 2008; 
Young 2009). With this said, Lindberg and Morrison challenge the notion that forces of 
clientelism are still significantly affecting voting behavior. Although future research is 
needed in this area, for the purpose of this study I assume that, if clientelism is present 
and significant in Kenyan elections, respondents will portray this through answering 
truthfully when asked about their voting behavior and freedom to vote according to their 
own personal views.   
Another crucial factor of this research is the notion of ethnic voting. Lindberg and 
Morrison find that, like clientelism, a significant amount of Ghanians’ voting behavior is 
motivated by ethnicity. Much research has been conducted on the issue of ethnicity in 
Africa, which is mentioned in the following section. 
Ethnicity and Voting 
As proven by the 2007 post-election violence, ethnic identity is a major issue in 
Kenya today and quite relevant in any study relating to the national elections. Because 
ethnic identity is such an influential factor in Kenyan politics, it is only fair that it plays a 
major role in shaping the research question of this study, and without paying close 
attention to its effect on voting behavior this study would be incomplete.  
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According to the CIA World Factbook (2010), Kenya’s population is 39 million 
people. Although there are more than 70 different ethnic groups in Kenya, 70 percent of 
the population belongs to the five biggest ethnic groups. The largest ethnic group is 
Kikuyu, which constitutes about 22 percent of the total population; the next four biggest 
groups are Luo (14%), Luhya(13%), Kalenjin (12%), and Kamba (11%)  (CIA The 
World… 2010). Kenya’s ethnic groups can be divided into three broad linguistic groups, 
the Bantu, the Nilotes, and the Cushites (CIA The World… 2010). The Kikuyu fall into 
the Bantu category, and although they make up a mere fifth of the total population, they 
are overwhelmingly dominant in terms of representation and influence in the political 
realm (African Studies Center 2010). It is worth noting that Kenya’s first president, Mzee 
Jomo Kenyatta, as well as the current president, Mwai Kibaki, both belong to the Kikuyu 
ethnic group (African Studies Center 2010). 
As mentioned briefly in the previous section, Kenya’s first true attempt at a 
democratic government came with elections in 1992. One of the consequences of having 
multiparty elections for the first time in 1992 was ethnic grouping in voting behavior, and 
this became a pattern mirrored in the 1997 elections (Bratton and Kimenyi  2008). This 
has led many to believe that Kenya’s elections revolve mainly around cultural and ethnic 
factors. This is known as an “ethnic census,” a term coined by Donald Horowitz (1985), 
and it refers to elections that take place as a mere formality and are easily predicted 
because of ethnic cohesions (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008:3). Many scholars agree that 
ethnic identity is the single major factor affecting voting behavior in societies that are 
extremely fragmented ethnically (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008).  
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With this said, Bratton and Kimenyi (2008) argue that the 2002 elections as well 
as the 2007 elections in Kenya have shown that ethnicity is not the only important factor 
affecting Kenyans and their voting patterns. While the researchers do not completely 
disregard ethnicity as a driving factor in voting behavior, they find that it is neither the 
only factor nor necessarily the most important one. In their study they find that policy 
issues sometimes trump ethnic background in making voting decisions, especially among 
people who do not identify themselves in terms of ethnic groups within Kenya.     
Norris and Mattes’ (2003) earlier study supports these findings. They agree that 
ethnolinguistic factors are major players in voting behavior, but they are interested in 
finding the extent to which this holds true and whether structural factors play an 
equivalent role in party identification. Although Kenya was not included in their study, 
their findings suggest that ethnic and linguistic factors do influence party identification 
and voting behavior significantly in many countries in Africa, but not all. Other recent 
studies have found that issues relating to the national economy and personal-economic 
well being trump ethnic identity in some African countries (Bratton and Kimenyi 2008). 
Feelings of Freedom to Vote: Unanswered Questions 
Canache and Allison (2005) find evidence that perception of corruption has a 
direct and significant effect on public opinion and on the way people vote. From this they 
conclude that elected officials that engage in politically corrupt activities do so at their 
own risk because according to their results citizens that acknowledge corruption would 
vote against it. I, however, wonder whether there are other factors in addition to that 
perceived corruption and political support. Do citizens who think that there are high 
levels of corruption fear voting freely? In other words, does perception of corruption as 
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well as fear of being subject to political violence or intimidation affect the way voters 
feel about being free to vote without reservation? In addition, does political trust and 
one’s ethnic identity play a role in affecting voters’ opinion, aside from their knowledge 
about corruption within the government? These are among the main questions that this 
research seeks to answer.  
Conclusion 
The topic of voting has been a popular area of research for decades. Because 
African countries have recently made a transition toward democratization, research 
specific to this continent is limited. Much of the research conducted thus far has been 
done using the data from the Afrobarometer Survey. The focus of my study looks at 
feelings of freedom to vote according to one’s own will and the extent to which this is 
affected by perception of corruption, trust in the government, fear of being subject to 
political violence or intimidation, and ethnic identity. While much research has been done 
on most of these topics individually, I have yet to find studies that connect any of these 
studies with my dependent variable.  
In summary, most research conducted suggests that African countries are 
struggling to keep the process of democratization smooth and peaceful. Corruption has 
been a part of many of these governments since the beginning, and it will take more than 
one peaceful election to change this. Studies are needed in all areas related to voting 
behavior. In addition, because of the changing nature of the governments, comparative 
research will be needed in the future. The following section describes the methodology 
employed in this study. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
In this chapter I give a description of the data and the survey that were used for 
this study. Next is a brief section stating the hypotheses of my research, which is 
followed by a detailed description of the dependent and independent variables. This 
section ends with an explanation of the analysis employed.  
Data 
This research study utilizes data from the fourth round of the Afrobarometer 
Survey collected in Kenya. Afrobarometer is an independent project that collects data 
from African countries to gain insight into their political, social, and economic lives. The 
Afrobarometer surveys and collects data in waves, and for this project I will use the most 
recent 2008 wave, which is composed of 1,104 respondents.  
To collect the data, Afrobarometer uses in-depth interviews as well as surveys 
provided to national probability samples. The goal of this project was to gather data 
regarding sociopolitical issues in relation to national elections from a representative 
national sample of the voting population in Kenya. The respondents were asked to answer 
more than 100 questions, whereby the 331 variables that make up the dataset were 
created. This study analyzes the relationship between freedom to vote without pressure 
and perception of corruption, trust in national government, fear of being subject to 
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political violence and intimidation, ethnicity, and whether or not the participants feel that 
the last elections were free and fair.  
Hypotheses 
Five initial hypotheses were drawn regarding the relationships between the 
dependent variable and each independent variable: 
H1: Kenyan voters will be more likely to feel free to vote for whom they choose if 
they have a low perception of corruption within the government. 
H2: The higher the level of Kenyan voters’ trust in the government is, the more 
likely it is that they will feel free to vote for whom they choose without 
pressure.   
H3:  The more Kenyan voters fear being subject to political violence or 
intimidation, the less likely they are to feel free to vote for whom they 
choose. 
H4: Kenyan voters who believe that in their country elections are free and fair 
will be more likely to feel free to vote for whom they chose without pressure.  
H5: Members of the four dominant Kenyan tribes feel freer to vote according to 
their own preference than do members of other ethnic groups.  
 The data in Table 1 show the descriptive statistics of the six variables used in this 
study. This table includes the dependent variable, the five independent variables, and the 
control variables. It is directly followed by a brief description of each variable, beginning 
with the dependent variable.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
      
  obs.  Mean St. Dev Var. Median Min Max.  
Freedom to 
Choose for 
Whom to Vote 
1088 .79 .40 .16 1.00 .00 1.00 
        
Perceived 
Corruption 915 .00 .88 .78 -.121 -2.11 2.47 
        
Trust in 
Government 1029 .00 .84 .71 0.00 -1.72 1.61 
        
Fear of Political 
Violence and 
Intimidation 
1094 1.18 1.2 1.25 1.00 .00 3.00 
        
Dominant Tribe 1097 .35 .48 .23 0.00 .00 1.00 
        
2007 Free and 
Fair  1081 1.78 .77 .59 2.00 1.00 3.00 
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable used in this research is “Freedom to choose for whom to 
vote.” The original question in the survey asked “in this country, how free are you to 
choose who to vote for without feeling pressured (Afrobarometer Codebook p. 10).” This 
variable was recoded into a dichotomous variable. This was done because in its original 
form, some of the response categories were very small. The response categories of the 
original variable include 1. “Not at all free,” 2. “Not very free,” 3. “Somewhat free,” 4. 
“Completely free.”  As shown in Table 2, the first three response categories, “not at all 
free,” “not very free,” and “somewhat free” were combined into “not completely free,” 
which together represent 20.3 percent of the respondents.  The “completely free” 
response category was left intact representing 79.4 percent of the participants. This 
variable includes 1,088 respondents of the original 1,104, with the missing values making 
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up a small 1.4 percent. The descriptive statistics of this variable are shown on Table 1, 
and include a mean of .79 and a standard deviation of .40. The section that follows 
discusses the independent variables.  
Table 2.  Frequency Distribution: Freedom to Choose for Whom to Vote 
 
Freedom to Choose for Whom to Vote Freq. Percent Cum. 
Not Completely Free 224 20.3 20.6 
Completely Free 864 79.4 100.0 
Total 1088 98.6   
 
Independent Variables 
This study will include five independent variables. The first is perceived 
corruption; the second is trust in government; the third is fear of political intimidation or 
violence; the fourth is ethnicity; and the last one is free and fair elections.   
Perceived Corruption  
The first independent variable is “perceived corruption in the government,” which 
was created by combining four variables. To measure perceived corruption I used four 
questions that asked the participants about their views on the amount of corruption 
currently present in a particular office/institution in the government: “How many of the 
following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough 
about them to say. (Afrobarometer Codebook p. 24)” 
Q1: The President and Officials in His Office? 
Q2: The Prime Minister and Officials in His Office? 
Q3: Members of Parliament? 
Q4: Government Officials? 
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All the questions have the same valid response categories which were “none,” 
“some of them,” “most of them,” and “all of them.” The fact that these variables are all 
measured in the same way allows me to easily combine them and calculate an average to 
create the scale “perceived corruption in government.” However, to create this scale, it 
must be shown that the questions that I want to combine are related to each other and that 
the scale would be unidimensional. The first requirement is met through the reliability 
test conducted. This was done to check how closely related the variables of the group are 
to each other. The data in Table 2 in Appendix A show that the Chronbach’s alpha for 
this group of variables is .771, which is evidence that there is internal reliability as 
anything above .70 is an acceptable reliability coefficient (Santos 1999). In other words, 
the variables are highly related to each other.  
The second requirement was met through factor analysis, which checks the 
dimensionality of the group of variables. The data in Table 3 show the total variance 
explained by the group of variables. We can see that the Eigen-value in the first 
component is the only one above one, and it accounts for 46.053 percent of the variance. 
This is evidence that the scale is unidimensional. For more details on this test see 
Appendix A.   
The valid response categories for all four variables were the same, and included:  
“none,” “some of them,” “most of them,” “all of them,” and “don’t know.” For frequency 
distributions of each of these variables please see Appendix C. This scale includes 915 
participants and has a standard deviation of .88.  More details on the descriptive statistics 
of this scale can be found in Table 1. 
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Table 3.  Total Variance Explained  
       
Comp 
Onents Initial Eigen Values   
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings   
  Total % of Variance Cum. % Total % of Variance Cum. % 
1 2.374 59.351 59.351 1.842 46.053 46.053 
2 0.702 17.546 76.897    
3 0.492 12.301 89.197    
4 0.432 10.803 100       
 
Trust in Government 
The second independent variable is “trust in government.” This variable was 
created by the same process as was used to create the “perceived corruption” scale. It is a 
compilation of a set of questions asked in the survey in relation to political trust. The four 
original questions combined all ask the same question about different political 
leaders/institutions. The survey asked, “How much do you trust each of the following, or 
haven’t you heard enough about them to say: (Afrobarometer Codebook p. 23)”  
Q1: The President? 
Q2: The Prime Minster?  
Q3: Parliament? 
Q4: The Electoral Commission of Kenya? 
The valid response categories for all five questions are the same, and they include: “not at 
all,” “just a little,” “somewhat,” “a lot,” and “don’t know/haven’t heard enough.” For 
frequency distributions of each of these variables see Appendix D. The same process was 
followed to ensure reliability and unidimensionality. The data in Table 2 of Appendix B 
show that the variables are related to each other with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.687.  
The group of variables is shown to be unidimensional through the factor analysis 
statistics shown by the data in Table 4. The Eigen value of the first component is the only 
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one above one. Furthermore, component one is responsible for 36.626 percent of the 
variance. For more details on this test see Appendix B. This scale includes 1,029 
participants, and has a standard deviation of .88.  More details on the descriptive statistics 
of this scale can be found on Table 1. 
Table 4.  Total Variance Explained  
       
Comp 
Onents Initial Eigen Values   
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings   
  Total % of Variance Cum. % Total % of Variance Cum. % 
1 2.075 51.869 51.869 1.465 36.626 36.626 
2 .897 22.432 74.301    
3 .568 14.195 88.496    
4 .460 11.504 100       
 
Fear of Political Violence or Intimidation 
The third independent variable included in this analysis is “fear of political 
violence or intimidation,” which measures the extent to which people fear being 
subjected to political violence or intimidation. The original survey question asked the 
respondents the following question: “During election campaigns in this country, how 
much do you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence? 
(Afrobarometer Codebook p. 22)” The valid response categories for this variable are: “a 
lot,” “somewhat,” “a little bit,” “not at all.” 
Table 5.  Frequency Distribution: Fear of Political Violence/Intimidation 
 
Fear of Political Violence/Intimidation Freq. Percent Cum. 
A lot 413 37.8 37.8 
Somewhat 265 24.2 62 
A little bit 225 20.6 82.5 
Not at all 191 17.5 100 
Total 1094 100   
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The data in Table 5 show the frequency distributions of this variable. A total of 
1,094 participants was included in this variable, leaving out .9 percent as missing values. 
Descriptive statistics for this variable can be found in Table 1 and include a mean of 1.18 
and a standard deviation of 1.11.  
Dominant Tribe  
 “Dominant Tribe” is the fourth independent variable used in this research. The 
original survey question asked the participants “What is your tribe? You know, your 
ethnic or cultural group.” (Afrobarometer Codebook p. 47) The response categories of the 
original variable include over twenty different tribes. For this study a dummy variable 
was created, but a frequency distribution table can be found in Appendix E. The dummy 
variable created is a dichotomous variable, with one category being a combination of the 
dominant tribal groups in Kenya and the other category a combination of nondominant 
tribes. The “dominant tribes” category includes the Kikuyu, Kamba, Meru , and Embu 
tribes. A total of 1,097 participants were included in this dummy variable, leaving out .6 
percent as missing values. The data in Table 6 show the frequency distribution of this 
variable. The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1 and include a mean of 0.35 
and a standard deviation of 0.48. 
Table 6.  Frequency Distribution: Dominant Tribes 
 
Dominant Tribes Freq. Percent Cum. 
Non-Dominant Tribes 709 64.2 64.2 
Dominant Tribes (Kikuyu,Kamba, 
Meru, and Embu) 388 35.4 99.4 
Total 1097 99.4   
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Free and Fair Elections 2007  
The fifth and last independent variable included in this research is “Free and Fair 
Elections.” This variable measures the extent to which voters in Kenya feel that the past 
elections held in Kenya in 2007 were free and fair. The original survey asked the 
participants, “On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last 
national election, held in 2007?” (Afrobarometer Codebook 2008: 39) The original 
response categories for this question include: 1. “not free and fair,” 2. free and fair, with 
major problems,” 3. “free and fair, but with minor problems,” and 4. “completely free 
and fair.” This variable was recoded by combining the categories “free and fair, with 
minor problems” and “completely free and fair” into one category. This was done 
because “completely free” alone accounted for only an extremely small percentage of the 
total population.   
The data in Table 7 show the frequency distributions of this variable. This 
variable includes 1,081 participants and has a mean of 1.78 and a standard deviation of 
0.77. For more details on the descriptive statistics of this variable see Table 1.  A brief 
description of additional control variables follows. 
Table 7.  Frequency Distribution: Free and Fair Elections 2007 
 
Elections Free and Fair Freq. Percent Cum. 
Not Free and Fair 463 42.8 42.8 
Free and Fair, with Major Problems 394 36.4 79.3 
Free and Fair, with Minor Problems or 
Completely Free 224 20.7 100 
Total 1081 100   
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Control Variables  
Thus far a description of the dependent and independent variables used in the 
analysis of this research has been provided. Besides these, three control variables were 
also included in the analysis, which include “education,” “gender,” and “age.” Table 8 
provides the descriptive statistics of each.  
Table 8. Descriptive Statistics: Control Variables  
      
  obs.  Mean St. Dev Variance Median Min Max.  
Education  1100 3.77 1.808 3.271 4.00 0 9 
        
Gender  1104 1.50 .500 2.50 2.00 1 2 
        
Age  1100 35.0309 12.35621 152.676 32.000 18 67 
 
 The first control variable, education, includes 1,100 participants, and the original 
survey asked the respondents “what is the highest level of education you have 
completed? (Afrobarometer Codebook 2008:49)” The response categories range from 
“no formal schooling” to “post-graduate.” For details on the frequency distribution of this 
variable see Table 2 in Appendix F. The data in Table 8 show that the descriptive 
statistics of this variable include a mean of 3.77 and a standard deviation of 1.81.  
 The next control variable included in this research is gender. The original survey 
asked the participants to indicate their gender, and all 1,104 respondents were included in 
this variable. The response categories included “male” and “female,” with males making 
up 49.8 percent of the total population and females 50.2 percent. A frequency distribution 
table can be found in Table 1 in Appendix F. Table 8 indicates that this variable has a 
mean of 1.50 and a standard deviation of .50.  
 Last, the variable “age” was used as a control variable. The original survey 
question asked the respondents to indicate their age, and 1,100 participants were included 
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in this variable. The response categories ranged from “18” to “95,” but this variable was 
recoded into categories ranging from “18” – “67” due to the low number of cases that 
indicated being an age older than 67. For a frequency distribution of this variable see 
Table 3 in Appendix F. The data in Table 8 show that the variable age has a mean of 
35.03 and a standard deviation of 12.36. 
Analysis 
As stated previously, in conducting this research I sought to find out the extent to 
which citizens of Kenya feel free to vote for whom they choose without pressure during 
national elections. In addition, I want to know what role certain factors, the independent 
variables, play in establishing these feelings of freedom or lack thereof.  To obtain these 
results I have conducted both bivariate and multivariate analyses. First I used a 
correlation matrix to determine the individual relationship between the dependent 
variable and each independent variable. Second, I conducted logistic regression analysis 
to predict the extent to which the combination of the independent variables explains 
freedom to vote in Kenya according to one’s preference and without pressure.  
As explained by Dayton (1992), logistic regression analysis is best suited for 
“research situations in which the outcome variable is categorical. [www.bus.utk.edu; 
para. 1]” LRA works by basing the probabilities on the values of the dependent variable; 
and because it is the case for most situations, the dependent variable is assumed to be 
dichotomous.  For this study the dependent variable, feelings of freedom to vote in 
Kenya, is a dichotomous variable, and so logistic regression analysis was employed. 
 Four different logistic regression models were conducted. Model 1 includes only 
the independent variables that relate to attitudes. Model 2 combines the attitudinal and 
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demographic variables. Model 3 also includes squared variables of perceived corruption 
and perceived trust. This is done as a requirement for Model 4, which has two additional 
interaction terms. To run a regression model with interaction terms, one must first check 
to see whether the squared terms of the variable affect the model (Ganzach 1998).  The 
squared terms included in Model 3 are of perceived corruption and trust in government. 
 Then, in Model 4 perceived corruption and trust in government are combined 
with dominant tribe to create two interaction terms. This is done to account for the 
possible effect that dominant tribe might have on the results. As established by the theory 
section and the review of literature, ethnicity is a major player in Kenyan elections. In 
this study the centrality of ethnicity is portrayed through H5, in which being a member of 
a dominant tribe is the key factor. Thus, by creating interaction terms of dominant tribe, 
Model 4 accounts for the possible effect produced by voters who are both, a member of a 
dominant tribe in Kenyan, and, either perceive high levels of corruption or have high 
levels of trust in the government.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
ANALYSES 
 
In short, this study seeks to determine the extent to which certain attitudinal and 
demographic factors play a role in Kenyan voters’ feelings of freedom to vote without 
pressure. This chapter takes a closer look at both the bivariate and multivariate analyses 
used to test the hypotheses. More important, this chapter includes a detailed explanation 
of the results of the analyses to determine whether my hypotheses are supported by the 
data. Finally, these results are used to draw some conclusions and make implications 
about the topic under research. The bivariate analysis is the first test of the hypotheses. 
Bivariate Analysis: Correlation Matrix 
First a correlation matrix was created to examine the bivariate relationships 
between the dependent variable and the independent variables. The data in Table 9 show 
the correlations between the attitudinal independent variables and feelings of freedom to 
vote. Attitudinal variables refer to perceived corruption, trust in government, fear of 
political violence and intimidation, and perception of free and fair elections in 2007.  
The data in Table 9 show that none of the correlations between the dependent 
variable and the independent variables are significant. However, it does show that all 
independent variables are highly correlated with each other. Each relationship is 
significant at the .001 level except that between perceived corruption and fear of political 
violence or intimidation, which is significant at the .01 level. The data in Table 9 also 
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show that the relationships between perceived corruption and the rest of the attitudinal 
variables are all negative, which means that as voters perceive more corruption there is a 
decrease in trust in the government, fear of being subject to political violence or 
intimidation, and the chances that they thought the 2007 elections would be free and fair 
prior to taking place. The strongest of these relationships is the one between perceived 
corruption and trust in government, with a Pearson’s Correlation of -.384. The fact that 
the relationship between perceived corruption and fear of political violence and 
intimidation is negative is interesting because it suggests that when perceived corruption 
is high, fear is low or vice versa. With this said, this relationship is weak, with a Person’s 
correlation of -.100.  
Table 9. Correlation Matrix: Dependent Variable and Attitudinal Variables       
     
    Freedom to Vote 
Perceived 
Corruption  
Trust in 
Gov. 
Fear Pol. 
Violence 
Free/Fair 
2007 
Freedom  Pearson’s R  1 -.010 .040 -.026 -.005 
 to Vote Sig. 2-tail   .754 .200 .393 .858 
  N 1088 903 1017 1080 1067 
Perceived  Pearson’s R  -.010 1 -.384 -.100 -.162 
Corruption  Sig. 2-tail .754   ***.000 **.002 ***.000 
  N 903 915 883 907 902 
Trust in Pearson’s R  .040 -.384 1 .126 .270 
Gov. Sig. 2-tail .200 ***.000   ***.000 ***.000 
  N 1017 883 1029 1021 1013 
Fear Pol. Pearson’s R  -.026 -.100 .126 1 .106 
 Violence Sig. 2-tail .393 **.002 ***.000   ***.001 
 N 1080 907 1021 1094 1071 
Free/Fair Pearson’s R  -.005 -.162 .270 .106 1 
 2007 Sig. 2-tail .858 ***.000 ***.000 ***.001  
  N 1067 902 1013 1071  
NOTE: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
The data in Table 10 show the correlation matrix between the demographic and 
the attitudinal variables. First, they indicate that freedom to vote is significantly and 
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positively correlated with education at the .01 level with a p-value of .006. This implies 
that the higher the level of education that voters have completed, the freer they will feel 
to vote according to their own will.  
Table 10. Correlation Matrix: Demographic and Attitudinal Variables       
       
  Freedom to Vote 
Perceived 
Corruption  
Trust in 
Gov. 
Fear Pol. 
Violence 
Free/Fair 
2007 
Dominant Pearson’s R  .007 .126 .066 .090 .249 
Tribe Sig. 2-tail .809 ***.000 *.036 **.003 ***.000 
  N 1081 909 1022 1087 1074 
Education Pearson’s R  .083 .105 -.140 .063 .039 
  Sig. 2-tail **.006 ***.001 ***.000 *.037 .194 
  N 1085 911 1026 1093 1090 
Gender Pearson’s R  -.044 -.023 .006 .015 -.042 
  Sig. 2-tail .151 .484 .837 .630 .168 
  N 1088 915 1029 1097 1094 
Age  Pearson’s R  -.032 -.040 .090 -.042 .047 
  Sig. 2-tail .287 .231 **.004 .161 .120 
  N 1084 912 1026 1093 1090 
NOTE: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
Another important variable included in Table 10 is dominant tribe. As described 
in the previous chapter, the variable of dominant tribe divides voters into those who 
belong to the four main ethnic tribes in Kenya and those who do not. Although the 
correlation matrix table does not show an association between dominant tribe and the 
dependent variable, it does show that belonging to a dominant tribe in Kenya is 
significantly associated with all attitudinal variables included in the study. In addition, the 
data in Table 10 show that trust in government is positively correlated with all 
demographic variables except gender. This implies that being older, having higher levels 
of education completed, and belonging to a dominant tribe are all associated with having 
more trust in the government.  
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Table 11 is a continuation of the correlation matrix, portraying the correlations 
between the demographic variables and how they are correlated with each other. The data 
in Table 11 show that being a member of a dominant tribe is correlated only with 
education, which suggests that those who have higher education are more likely to belong 
to a dominant tribe in Kenya.  This relationship is very weak, with a Pearson’s correlation 
of .063, but it is significant at the .05 level with a p-value of. 037. Education, gender, and 
age are all associated with each other and are significant at the .001 level. All three 
relationships are negative but weak, which suggests that, in Kenya, both males and 
younger people achieve higher levels of education.  
Table 11. Correlation Matrix: Demographic Variables       
      
    
Dominant 
Tribe Education  Gender  Age  
Dominant 
Tribe 
 
Pearson’s R 
Sig. 2-tail 
N 
1 
 
1097 
.063 
*.037 
1093 
.015 
.630 
1097 
-.042 
.161 
1093 
Education Pearson’s R  .063 1 -.114 -.203 
  Sig.  *.037   ***.000 ***.000 
  N 1093 1100 1100 1096 
Gender Pearson’s R  .015 -.114 1 -.130 
  Sig.  .630 ***.000   ***.000 
  N 1097 1100 1104 1100 
Age  Pearson’s R  -.042 -.203 -.130 1 
  Sig.  .161 ***.000 ***.000   
  N 1093 1096 1100 1100 
NOTE: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
Multivariate Analysis: Logistic Regression 
 Next, a logistic regression analysis was conducted to help predict the extent to 
which the combination of independent variables explains the dependent variable, freedom 
to vote according to one’s own will and without pressure. Logistic regression models 
were conducted to obtain more accurate results. The reason they are more accurate is that, 
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unlike bivariate analysis, logistic regression models help predict the effect that an 
independent variable has on the dependent variable while holding the rest of the 
independent variables constant. In other words, while a correlation matrix can account for 
only one relationship at the time, logistic regression takes into consideration all the 
independent variables simultaneously, thus producing more accurate results. The data in 
Table 12 show the four logistic regression models conducted in this study.  
Table 12. Logistic Regression (Standard Errors in Parentheses)      
      
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(Freedom to 
Vote) O.R. / se O.R. / se O.R. / se O.R. / se 
Perceived 
Corruption 1.059 1.022 1.034 1.142 
 (.107) (.109) (.122) (.151) 
Trust in Gov. *1.303 *1.278 *1.305 1.149 
 (.118) (.119) (.125) (.147) 
Fear Pol. 
Violence .867 *.855 *.851 .844 
 (.078) (.079) (.080) (.081) 
Free Fair 2007 .906 .927 .923 *.890 
 (.120) (.125) (.125) (.125) 
Dominant Tribe 1.030 1.024 1.096 
  (.196) (.198) (.204) 
Education 1.083 1.087 1.076 
  (.051) (.052) (.052) 
Gender  .792 .801 .793 
  (.178) (.179) (.180) 
Age   1.001 1.002 1.000 
  (.008) (.008) (.008) 
Trust2   1.117 1.121 
   (.114) (.115) 
Corruption2  .984 1.020 
   .076 .082 
Etrust    1.486 
    0.256 
Ecorruption   0.779 
    0.239 
Pseudo R-Squared .015 0.022 0.023 0.034 
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Model 1 
The first logistic regression model includes only the attitudinal independent 
variables. Among these are perceived corruption, trust in government, fear of political 
violence and intimidation, and free and fair elections in 2007. When only these variables 
are included, the results support only one of my hypotheses. Trust in government has an 
odds ratio of 1.303 and is statistically significant at the .05 level. This means that for 
every one unit increase in trust in government, there is a 30.3 percent increase in the odds 
of feeling free to vote according to personal preference. These results support H2, which 
states that voters in Kenya who have higher levels of trust in the government will feel 
freer to vote according to their own will.   
Model 2 
 Model 2 is a combination of the attitudinal variables and the demographic 
variables. The results in Model 2 support both H2 and H3.  
First, trust in government has an odds ratio of 1.278, which suggests that for every 
one unit increase in trust, there is a 27.8 percent increase in the odds that voters will feel 
free to vote according to their own will without pressure. This shows a small decrease of 
2.2 percent in the odds ratio from that suggested in Model 1. The fact that the difference 
between Model 1 and Model 2 is small justifies having Model 2 because it shows that 
even when adding three variables to the model, the results still hold true, and they vary 
only slightly.  In addition, Model 2 differs from Model 1 in that it not only supports H1 
but also H3. The difference between Model 1 and Model 2 could be due to the inter-
correlation between the attitudinal and demographic variables. Thus, when controlling for 
demographics, Model 2 reveals a new relationship. 
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 More specifically Model 2 shows that fear of political violence and intimidation is 
statistically significant at the .05 level. This variable has an odds ratio of .855, which 
suggests that for every one unit increase in fear there is a 14.5 percent lesser odds that 
voters will feel that yes, they are free to vote according to their own will. These results 
support H3, in which I hypothesize that voters in Kenya will feel freer to vote according 
to their own will when they are not afraid of being subject to political violence and 
intimidation. It is interesting that these results are not consistent with the correlation 
matrix, which suggests that there is no association between fear of political violence and 
the dependent variable. This could also be due to the intercorrelation between the 
independent variables. Thus, even though the bivariate analysis suggests that a 
relationship between feelings of freedom to vote and fear of political violence is not 
significant, the relationship is revealed through multivariate analysis.   
Model 3 and Model 4 
Model 3 includes the squared terms of both perceived corruption and trust in 
government. According to Ganzach (1998), to run a regression model with interaction 
terms, one must first check the effects that the squared terms would have on the model. 
Thus, Model 3 serves the purpose of fulfilling the requirements necessary to include 
interaction terms in Model 4.  
Model 4 includes all of the independent variables, the squared terms of perceived 
corruption and trust in government, and two interaction terms of dominant tribe. The 
squared terms were included because, as argued by Ganzach (1998:621),  
“including quadric terms affords protection against type I and type II errors associated 
with the estimation of interaction when the true model includes quadric terms.” 
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An interaction term is calculated by multiplying two variables together. For this study the 
purpose of the interaction terms is to see whether there is any added effect for being a 
member of a dominant tribe, and it is calculated by multiplying two variables together. 
The first interaction term is seen in Table 12 as “Etrust,” and the purpose behind it is to 
check to see if there is any added effect for being both a member of a dominant tribe and 
having high levels of trust in the government. The second interaction term is 
“Ecorruption.” The purpose of this term is to check to see if being both a member of a 
dominant tribe and perceiving high levels of corruption affect the model.  Although 
dominant tribe is not significant in the previous models, interaction terms were still 
included because all of the previous models suggest that trust in government is 
significant.  
   Model 4 shows that, when the two interaction terms are included, the results 
change. Trust in government, which was significant in all the previous models, is no 
longer significant. Furthermore, fear of political violence and intimidation, which was 
shown to be statistically significant in Model 2 and Model 3, is also no longer statistically 
significant. Instead, with the inclusion of the interaction terms, the variable relating to the 
2007 elections’ freedom and fairness becomes statistically significant at the .05 level, and 
it has an odds ratio of .890. This means that, according to Model 4, for every one unit 
increase in the variable “free and fair elections in 2007” there are 11 percent lesser odds 
that voters will feel free to vote according to their will and without pressure. These results 
contradict H4, in which I initially hypothesized that those who responded that the 2007 
elections would be free and fair would feel freer to vote according to their own will.  
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The section that follows goes into further inquiry about the results of this study and the 
implications made by them as well as the conclusions drawn.   
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Kenya, like many other African countries, has a long history of political turmoil. 
Much of it is rooted in the power struggles between ethnic tribes. For decades now, and 
since first becoming an independent state in 1963, Kenya has begun the process of 
democratizing its elections with the goal of joining the Western world in the practice of 
free and fair elections. To this day Kenya has yet to see elections that are not only 
democratic but also peaceful. With this said, progress has been made, and the violence 
that resulted from the 2007 elections is proof that the Kenyans are more than ever fed up 
with tyranny and they demand freedom to choose their leaders.  It was these violent 
events after the 2007 presidential elections in Kenya that inspired me to do this study.    
By doing this research I hoped to gain insight into Kenyan voters’ feelings of 
freedom to vote for whom they choose and without pressure. Moreover, I wanted to find 
out the extent to which Kenyans’ feelings about their freedom to express their opinion 
through voting is affected by: (a.) perception of corruption in the government; (b.) levels 
of trust in the government; (c.) fear of being subject to political violence or intimidation; 
(d.) ethnic identity; and, last, (e.) whether voters thought that the 2007 elections would be 
free and fair before they took place. With these variables in mind, I hypothesized that 
feelings of freedom to vote in Kenya would increase if: 
H1: voters perceive low levels of corruption in the government; 
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H2: voters have high levels of trust in the government; 
H3: voters are not afraid of being subject to political violence or intimidation; 
H4: voters believed that the 2007 elections would be free and fair before they took 
place; and 
H5: voters belong to one of the four dominant tribes.  
To do this research I have used the data set from the survey collected by the 
Afrobarometer in 2008. I conducted both bivarite and multivariate analysis. More 
specifically I used a correlation matrix to look at the independent relationships between 
the variables, and then I conducted logistic-regression analysis to determine what factors 
help explain feelings of freedom to vote according to personal preference. Four different 
models were included in the logistic regression. The model that best represents this study 
is Model 2 because it includes all of the independent variables and reveals which of my 
hypotheses are supported. Models 3 and 4 were conducted for the purpose of checking to 
see whether the interaction term of dominant tribe would help explain feelings of 
freedom to vote according to personal preference, and the results suggest that interaction 
term of dominant tribe did not play a significant role. 
Model 2 suggests that both trust in the government and fear of being subject to 
political violence and intimidation help predict voters’ perception of freedom to vote 
according to their own preference, and these results support H2 and H3 of this study.  
Moreover, the results of Model 2 suggest that Kenyan voters’ feelings of freedom to vote 
according to their own preference increase if their levels of trust in the government also 
increase and if their fear of being subject to political violence and intimidation decreases.  
   49 
  
The fact that perception of corruption does not help explain feelings of freedom to 
vote is interesting. According to the bivariate analysis, perceived corruption is correlated 
with all the attitudinal independent variables as well as with dominant tribe and 
education. With this said, none of the logistic regression models suggests that perceived 
corruption is an explanatory variable of feelings of freedom to vote. These results reject 
H1, and no previous literature was found that linked or rejected a relationship between 
feelings of freedom to vote and perception of corruption. However, the negative 
relationship between perceived corruption and trust in government found by Della Porta 
(2000) is supported by the results of this study. Even though perceived corruption was 
not found to be a direct explanatory factor of feelings of freedom to vote according to 
personal preference, because the consistency of previous results are confirmed by this 
study, I suspect that perceived corruption plays a big role in voting behavior, and I urge 
future research be done on this topic. 
Another hypothesis that is rejected by the multivariate results is H5. According to 
Model 2, being a member of a dominant tribe is not a good predictor of freedom to vote 
in Kenya. This is surprising to me for the following reasons. First, the bivariate results 
show that, like perceived corruption, the variable dominant tribe is correlated with all of 
the attitudinal independent variables as well as education. Second, and more important, 
according to previous research, ethnicity is a very important factor shaping elections in 
Kenya. Bratton and Kimenyi (2008) argue that ethnic grouping in voting behavior was 
responsible for the outcomes of both the 1992 and 1997 elections. They also argued that 
ethnic identity is the most important factor influencing voting behavior when it comes to 
elections in ethnically fragmented societies, and they are in agreement with other 
   50 
  
scholars. What is interesting is that Bratton and Kimenyi (2008) found that in the 2002 
and 2007 elections in Kenya, ethnicity was an important factor influencing voting 
behavior but no longer the only important one.  
An important implication can be suggested by comparing the results of this study 
with those of previous research. Bratton and Kimenyi’s (2008) results suggest a decrease 
in the importance of ethnicity in voting behavior from 1992 and 1997 to 2002 and 2007. 
My results further confirm this pattern, with an even larger decrease. This is true to the 
extent that, according to this study, whether voters belong to a dominant tribe or not no 
longer plays an explanatory role in voting behavior, at least not as it did before.  If these 
results are accurate, this could mean that a very important change is taking place in 
Kenya. That is, if voting behavior in Kenya no longer revolves around ethnic identity and 
tribal politics, this could mean a very positive social change. Moreover, it would mean 
that Kenya is overcoming a major challenge when it comes to achieving the goal of 
having democratic and peaceful elections.  
Although the results have not supported all of the hypotheses of this study, the 
research question under consideration remains how is Kenyans’ freedom to express their 
own opinion through voting affected by their perception of levels of corruption in the 
government, their levels of trust in the government, their fear of becoming subject to 
political violence or intimidation, and, last, whether they belong to a dominant ethnic 
tribe.   
This research question was framed under two theoretical perspectives. First, a 
rational-choice approach combined with Pareto’s ([1916] 1935) theory of residues and 
derivations was applied. The implications made through the first theoretical approach 
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suggested that, when making decisions about voting, voters would analyze the situation 
in term of costs and benefits first, and then they would choose the path that is less costly 
and most beneficial. By adding Pareto’s ([1916] 1935) notion of residues, it was 
recognized that there are certain sentiments, feelings, or attitudes that play a role in 
shaping the analysis of costs and benefits.  The sentiments, feelings, or attitudes that I 
considered are perceived corruption, trust in government, and fear of political violence or 
intimidation. After the analysis was conducted, the results supported all but the 
stipulation about perception of corruption. This means that, while perception of 
corruption does not appear to be a driving factor in explaining the way voters in Kenya 
feel about their freedom to express their opinion through voting, other factors such as 
trust in government and fear of political violence do.  
The second theoretical approach that was applied to help explain the issue at hand 
was the insider-outsider perspective.  By using this perspective I contended that, because 
Kenya’s political arena has been dominated by ethnic feuds for decades,  voters’ feelings 
about different political parties and figures would vary depending on the ethnic tribe to 
which they claimed alliance and, in turn, would affect how they felt about voting. The 
results of this study do not support the implications made by this theory because they 
suggest that whether a voter belongs to one of the dominant tribes in Kenya or not does 
not affect how they feel about their freedom to vote. The fact that the theoretical 
implications initially made in this research are not supported by the results suggests a 
positive change in that Kenyans are no longer constrained by ethnic boundaries in terms 
of voting. With this said, this study does have its limitations, and future research needs to 
be conducted to check the reliability of the results. 
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First, the dependent variable, freedom to vote without pressure, was recoded into 
a dichotomous variable. This had to be done because of the disparity in the number of 
cases across the response categories. As a result, three response categories “not at all 
free,” “not very free,” and “somewhat free” were combined into “not completely free.” 
This is methodologically justified in Chapter IV, but future research should take this into 
consideration. Next because the survey was collected in 2008, very little research has 
been conducted. Thus, while the data are up to date, there is little research to back up the 
findings of this study. Last, I strongly urge future research to look further into the issue of 
ethnicity and voting behavior in Kenya. Although special attention was paid to the effect 
that ethnicity might have on voting behavior, this was not the sole purpose of this study. 
Thus, future researchers might consider making ethnicity the central focus. Even though 
the results of this study do not support previous research in deeming ethnicity a key 
factor in explaining voting behavior, it should still be considered in future research. 
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APPENDIX A 
Independent Variable: Perceived Corruption  
 
Reliability Test 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Summary Item Statistics  
     
  Mean Minimum Maximum Range Max./Min. 
Item Means 1.387 1.190 1.541 .351 1.295 
Item Variances .553 .528 .572 .044 1.084 
Interitem Covariances .253 .207 .307 .100 1.480 
Interitem Correlations .457 .373 .539 .166 1.446 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Reliability Statistics  
 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.771  4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Summary Item Statistics  
 
  Variance N of Items 
Item Means .025 4 
Item Variances .000 4 
Interitem Covariances .001 4 
Interitem Correlations .005 4 
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Factor Analysis 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Communalities  
 
  Initial Extraction 
Corruption: Office of the Presidency .379 .505 
Corruption: Office of the Prime Minister  .345 .451 
Corruption: Members of Parliament .390 .525 
Corruption: Government Officials .293 .361 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Total Variance Explained  
       
Comp 
Onents Initial Eigen Values   
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings   
  Total % of Variance Cum. % Total % of Variance Cum. % 
1 2.374 59.351 59.351 1.842 46.053 46.053 
2 0.702 17.546 76.897    
3 0.492 12.301 89.197    
4 0.432 10.803 100       
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APPENDIX B 
Independent Variable: Trust in Government 
 
Reliability Test 
 
  
 
Table 1.  Summary Item Statistics 
      
  Mean Minimum Maximum Range Max./Min. 
Item Means 1.491 .804 1.926 1.122 2.397 
Item Variances 1.046 .998 1.106 .108 1.109 
Interitem Covariances .371 .155 .490 .335 3.168 
Interitem Correlations .355 .149 .451 .303 3.036 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Reliability Statistics  
 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
0.687  4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Summary Item Statistics  
 
  Variance N of Items 
Item Means .235 4 
Item Variances .002 4 
Interitem Covariances .014 4 
Interitem Correlations .015 4 
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Factor Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Communalities  
 
  Initial Extraction 
Trust President .331 .519 
Trust Prime Minister  .262 .308 
Trust Parliament/National Assembly .280 .379 
Trust Electoral Commission .226 .259 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.  Total Variance Explained  
       
Comp 
Onents Initial Eigen Values   
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings   
  Total % of Variance Cum. % Total % of Variance Cum. % 
1 2.075 51.869 51.869 1.465 36.626 36.626 
2 .897 22.432 74.301    
3 .568 14.195 88.496    
4 .460 11.504 100       
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APPENDIX C 
 
Frequency Distributions: Perceived Corruption 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Corruption: Office of the Presidency 
     
Value Label Corruption: Office of the Presidency Freq. Percent Cum. 
-1 Missing 1 0.09 0.09 
0 None 83 7.52 7.61 
1 Some of Them 604 54.71 62.32 
2 Most of Them 221 20.02 82.34 
3 All of Them 92 8.33 90.67 
9 Don’t Know/Haven't Heard Enough 103 9.33 100 
 Total 1104 100   
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Corruption: Office of the Prime Minister 
     
Value Label Corruption: Office of the Prime minister Freq. Percent Cum. 
-1 Missing 1 0.09 0.09 
0 None 139 12.59 12.68 
1 Some of Them 555 50.27 62.95 
2 Most of Them 182 16.49 79.44 
3 All of Them 62 5.62 85.05 
9 Don’t Know/Haven't Heard Enough 165 14.95 100 
 Total 1104 100   
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Table 3.  Corruption: Government Officials 
      
Value Label Corruption: Government Officials Freq. Percent Cum. 
-1 Missing 2 0.18 0.18 
0 None 44 3.99 4.17 
1 Some of Them 497 45.02 49.18 
2 Most of Them 400 36.23 85.42 
3 All of Them 105 9.51 94.93 
9 Don’t Know/Haven't Heard Enough 56 5.07 100 
 Total 1104 100   
 
 
 
 
Table 4.  Corruption: Members of Parliament  
      
Value Label Corruption: Members of Parliament Freq. Percent Cum. 
-1 Missing 3 0.27 0.27 
0 None 51 4.62 4.89 
1 Some of Them 521 47.19 52.08 
2 Most of Them 368 33.33 85.42 
3 All of Them 90 8.15 93.57 
9 Don’t Know/Haven't Heard Enough 71 6.43 100 
 Total 1104 100   
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APPENDIX D 
 
Frequency Distributions: Trust in Government 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Trust President 
     
Value Label Trust President Freq. Percent Cum. 
-1 Missing 3 0.27 0.27 
0 Not at All 167 15.13 15.4 
1 Just a Little 297 26.9 42.3 
2 Somewhat 294 26.63 68.93 
3 A Lot  332 30.07 99 
9 Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough 11 1 100 
 Total 1104 100   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Trust Prime Minister 
     
Value Label  Trust Prime Minister  Freq. Percent Cum. 
-1 Missing 1 0.09 0.09 
0 Not at All 120 10.87 10.96 
1 Just a Little 221 20.02 30.98 
2 Somewhat 336 30.43 61.41 
3 A Lot  385 34.87 96.29 
9 Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough 41 3.71   
 Total 1104 1104   
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Table 3. Trust Prime Minister/National Assembly 
     
Value Label Trust Parliament/National Assembly Freq. Percent Cum. 
-1 Missing 4 0.36 0.36 
0 Not at all 184 16.67 17.03 
1 Just a little 333 30.16 47.19 
2 Somewhat 335 30.34 77.54 
3 A Lot  220 19.93 97.46 
9 Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough 28 2.54 100 
 Total 1104 100   
 
 
 
Table 4.  Trust in National Electoral Commission 
     
Value Label Trust in National Electoral Commission Freq. Percent Cum. 
-1 Missing 3 0.27 0.27 
0 Not at All 581 52.63 52.9 
1 Just a Little 209 18.93 71.83 
2 Somewhat 173 15.67 87.5 
3 A Lot  108 9.78 97.28 
9 Don't Know/Haven't Heard Enough 30 2.72 100 
 Total 1104 100   
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APPENDIX E 
 
Frequency Distributions: Dominant Tribe 
 
 
Table 1.  Tribe/Ethnic Group 
     
Value Label Q79 Tribe/Ethnic Group Freq. Percent Cum. 
-1 Missing 6 0.54 0.54 
300 Kikuyu 208 18.84 19.38 
301 Luo 135 12.23 31.61 
302 Luhya 136 12.32 43.93 
303 Kamba 116 10.51 54.44 
304 Meru 55 4.98 59.42 
305 Kisii 66 5.98 65.4 
306 Kalenjin 128 11.59 76.99 
307 Masai 21 1.9 78.89 
308 Mijikenda 32 2.9 81.79 
309 Taita 27 2.45 84.24 
310 Somali 96 8.7 92.93 
311 Pokot 12 1.09 94.02 
312 Turkana 9 0.82 94.84 
313 Bajuni 3 0.27 95.11 
315 Teso 8 0.72 95.83 
317 Embu 9 0.82 96.65 
318 Borana 2 0.18 96.83 
320 Arab 3 0.27 97.1 
321 Swahili 4 0.36 97.46 
322 Indian 2 0.18 97.64 
323 Gabra 7 0.63 98.28 
990 
Kenyan Only or "Doesn’t 
Think of Self in Those 
Terms" 6 0.54 98.82 
995 Others 12 1.09 99.91 
998 Refused 1 0.09 100 
  Total 1104 100  
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APPENDIX F 
Frequency Distributions: Control Variables 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Gender 
     
Value Label Gender Freq. Percent Cum. 
1 Male  550 49.82 49.82 
2 Female 554 50.18 100 
  Total 1104 100   
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Education 
     
Value Label Education Freq. Percent Cum. 
-1 Missing  4 0.36 0.36 
0 No Formal Schooling 63 5.71 6.07 
1 Informal Schooling Only 24 2.17 8.24 
2 Some Primary Schooling 202 18.3 26.54 
3 Primary School Completed 216 19.57 46.11 
4 Some Secondary School/High School 163 14.76 60.87 
5 
Secondary School Completed/High 
School 244 22.1 82.97 
6 
Post-Secondary Qualifications, Not 
University  151 13.68 96.65 
7 Some University 10 0.91 97.55 
8 University Completed 23 2.08 99.64 
9 Post Graduate 4 0.36 100 
 Total 1104 100  
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Table 3.  Age 
         
Age Freq. Percent Cum.  Age Freq. Percent Cum. 
18 26 2.36 2.36  51 7 0.63 87.77 
19 34 3.08 5.43  52 13 1.18 88.95 
20 37 3.35 8.79  53 4 0.36 89.31 
21 17 1.54 10.33  54 6 0.54 89.86 
22 44 3.99 14.31  55 5 0.45 90.31 
23 35 3.17 17.48  56 14 1.27 91.58 
24 33 2.99 20.47  57 6 0.54 92.12 
25 54 4.89 25.36  58 14 1.27 93.39 
26 40 3.62 28.99  59 2 0.18 93.57 
27 33 2.99 31.97  60 15 1.36 94.93 
28 52 4.71 36.68  61 4 0.36 95.29 
29 37 3.35 40.04  62 4 0.36 95.65 
30 57 5.16 45.2  63 7 0.63 96.29 
31 24 2.17 47.37  64 2 0.18 96.47 
32 45 4.08 51.45  65 7 0.63 97.1 
33 26 2.36 53.8  66 1 0.09 97.19 
34 21 1.9 55.71  67+ 27 2.4 99.59 
35 42 3.8 59.51  
Don’t 
Know 4 0.31 100 
36 30 2.72 62.23  Total 1104 100  
37 27 2.45 64.67      
38 25 2.26 66.94      
39 10 0.91 67.84      
40 42 3.8 71.65      
41 25 2.26 73.91      
42 22 1.99 75.91      
43 13 1.18 77.08      
44 12 1.09 78.17      
45 26 2.36 80.53      
46 13 1.18 81.7      
47 13 1.18 82.88      
48 14 1.27 84.15      
49 15 1.36 85.51      
50 18 1.63 87.14      
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